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Abstract
Significant attention has been devoted to determining the credibility of online
misinformation about the COVID-19 pandemic on social media. Here, we compare the
credibility of tweets about COVID-19 to datasets pertaining to other health issues.
We find that the quantity of information about COVID-19 is indeed overwhelming,
but that the majority of links shared cannot be rated for its credibility. Reasons for
this failure to rate include widespread use of social media and news aggregators. The
majority of links that could be rated came from credible sources; however, we found a
large increase in the proportion of state-sponsored propaganda among non-credible
and less credible URLs, suggesting that COVID-19 may be used as a vector to spread
misinformation and disinformation for political purposes. Overall, results indicate that
COVID-19 is unfolding in a highly uncertain information environment that not may
amenable to fact-checking as scientific understanding of the disease, and appropriate
public health measures, evolve. As a consequence, public service announcements must
adequately communicate the uncertainly underlying these recommendations, while
still encouraging healthy behaviors.
1 Introduction
COVID-19, an illness caused by the SARS-COV-2 virus, is a potentially fatal disease
that was declared a pandemic on March 11th, 2020 by the World Health Organization
(WHO) [4]. As the pandemic was emerging, the WHO declared a COVID-19
“infodemic” – “an overabundance of information, some accurate and some not that
makes it hard for people to find trustworthy sources and reliable guidance when they
need it.” [2] The quantity of untrustworthy content shared online can hamper an
effective public health response and create confusion and distrust among people (3),
ultimately leading to significant loss of life. Significant attention has focused on the
malicious aspects of this infodemic, for example, with the United Nations
characterizing it as an “‘infodemic’ of misinformation and cybercrime” [12].
Here, we seek to characterize the “infodemic” on Twitter – one of the world’s most
popular social media platforms. An exploratory study assessing information sharing
on Twitter early in the COVID-19 pandemic traced how tweet and retweet volume
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increased as the epidemic grew, with the volume of related tweets doubling between
January and March [26]. Furthermore, a recent Pan American Health Organization
publication characterized the infodemic as follows:
According to a study by the Center for Health Informatics at the University
of Illinois, in the month of March around 550 million tweets included the
terms coronavirus, corona virus, covid19, covid-19, covid 19 or pandemic.
An exponential increase in the volume of tweets occurred around the start
of the lockdown in Italy, reaching a plateau around the day the United
States declared the pandemic had become a national emergency. [7]
Nevertheless, Brandwatch – a digital consumer intelligence company – estimates
that Twitter users generate roughly 500 million tweets per day [3]. Thus, the numbers
of tweets must be contextualized relative to other health topics. Furthermore, as
online communities continue to try to make sense of the deluge of information, and
accompanying uncertainties, one would expect that all sources would be heavily
engaged in this collective sensemaking process, yielding a large amount of content. We
therefore seek to compare the number of tweets pertaining to COVID-19 to other
health topics, motivating our first research question:
1. Compared to other health topics, is there “an overabundance of information”
pertaining to COVID-19 online?
Widespread media coverage pertaining to the infodemic has focused on the
distribution of conspiracy theories and online scams. If the infodemic is indeed
characterized by malicious content, one might expect a higher proportion of this
content to come primarily from ”low-credibility” sources [19, 28] that “lack the news
media’s editorial norms and processes for ensuring the accuracy and credibility of
information” [21] because ”...the attribution of ’fakeness’ is...not at the level of the
story but at that of the publisher.” [21]. This should be especially true when
comparing COVID-19 social media samples to equivalent samples pertaining to other
topics. However, preliminary research regarding the prevalence of misinformation
surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic online seems to indicate that significant content
may actually come from credible sources, at least on Twitter [26]. Nevertheless,
estimates of the prevalence of content from non-credible sources varies widely. For
example, Singh et al. [26] found that key “myths” about coronavirus on Twitter
represent only roughly 1% of the investigators’ total sample, whereas Yang et al., [28]
have found a similar prevalence of all low-credibility sources on Twitter, with the total
volume of tweets from non-credible sources comparable to shares from a single
high-credibility or government source. In contrast, Cinelli et al. [15] found that
unreliable sources made up roughly 11% of rated content, with both reliable and
unreliable sources engaged with, and amplified, at roughly the same rate. Similarly, a
content analysis of coronavirus-related tweets from a two-day period in February
found that 10.6% of tweets contained false information [24]. Although all of these
prior studies found that information from credible sources was more prevalent than
information from non-credible sources, there is wide variability of estimates of
non-credible content. Furthermore, none of these studies compared their prevalence
estimates to any other Twitter datasets; thus, it is difficult to evaluate whether
COVID-19 tweets contain more content from non-credible sources than tweets about
other topics.
Beyond our ability to assess source credibility, significant content may come from
unrated sources. For example, “Plandemic,” a viral movie promoting conspiracy
theories about COVID-19, was primarily spread via social media, which hosts
user-generated content of varying reliability [17]. Similar concerns apply to content
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linking to online vendors, such as amazon.com, which may sell reliable content,
unreliable content, or may even contain questionable material in comments posted to
otherwise unrelated products. Indeed, prior work [26] shows that four of the top ten
most shared domains in a set of COVID-19 tweets included two social media platforms
(youtu.be/youtube.com, and instagram.com) and Amazon (amzn.to). This motivates
our second research question:
2. How much of the information that is shared comes from untrustworthy, and
unrated, sources?
Beyond source credibility, a recent analysis of misinformation and disinformation
during the infodemic emphasized the prevalence of racism, xenophobia, conspiracy
theories, health misinformation, and malicious geopolitical actors [27]. These findings
seem to accord with our previous findings that Russian Twitter trolls have amplified
the vaccine debate in order to promote discord in American politics [14]. More
recently, news reports have alleged that networks of state-sponsored bot accounts were
actively promoting misinformation about COVID-19 [13]. Finally, several outlets have
reported that state-sponsored propaganda has employed COVID-19 narratives to
achieve geopolitical ends. For example, the US State Department [1] and the
European Union [6] have both reported that state actors, and especially Russia, have
taken advantage of COVID-19 to promote narratives that promote their geopolitical
interests, at the expense of Western democracies. Additionally, the US State
Department has alleged that Russia, China, and Iran have amplified one anothers’
false narratives. This motivates our third research question:
3. Compared to other health topics, which untrustworthy sources were more likely
to share content about COVID-19?
2 Materials and Methods
2.1 Measuring Volume of Information
We collected a COVID-19 specific Twitter data set using the Social Feed Manager
software [22], which collected English-language tweets from the Twitter API’s
statuses/filter streaming endpoint [10] that matched keywords of #Coronavirus,
#CoronaOutbreak, and #COVID19 between March 3, 2020 and May 2, 2020.
We compared this dataset to data from the same time period from two ongoing
collections of tweets: one containing keywords pertaining to generalized health topics
(the “health stream”1 [23]), and one containing keywords pertaining to
1Containing the following keywords: ill, sick, cold, body, pain, hurts, sore, nose, hospital, doc-
tor, cancer, killing, stomach, headache, neck, ear, throat, chest, hurting, ouch, massage, burning, flu,
exhausted, medicine, surgery, knee, cough, fever, doctors, insomnia, irritated, freezing, intense, emer-
gency, dose, miserable, exercise, cure, eaten, dentist, vision, bedtime, physical, treatment, pills, coma,
pounds, dealing, breathing, insurance, feelin, tooth, heal, appointment, ache, ankle, pill, numb, re-
covery, physically, wrist, depression, hungover, allergies, allergic, nurse, stroke, meds, cramps, woken,
muscles, dizzy, clinic, pains, jaw, sneeze, lungs, swollen, puke, anxiety, appt, recover, severe, headaches,
thirsty, vomit, tension, sneezing, caffeine, itchy, appetite, resting, coughing, infection, diabetes, mi-
graine, sickness, uncomfortable, pounding, mild, aching, itching, hiccups, forehead, illness, recovering,
hurtin, ribs, medication, aches, stuffy, advil, sneezed, symptoms, prescription, nyquil, drained, asthma,
lung, anxious, itch, remedy, elbow, infected, sinus, kidney, allergy, torn, rash, chronic, tumor, poisoning,
pimples, crutches, diagnosed, tylenol, nauseous, stiff, bladder, splitting, fatigue, lump, bruised, puking,
germs, sunburn, relieve, runny, rehab, paracetamol, panadol, stomachache, watering, faint, toothache,
icky, blisters, throbbing, veins, dehydrated, spine, heartburn, dental, nausea, needles, watery, puffy,
yucky, surgeon, colds, antibiotics, vomiting, skull, shivering, acne, sniffles, healed, throats, painkillers,
contagious, vitamins, stomache, strep, tiredness, benadryl, sinuses, congestion, ibuprofen, withdrawal,
arthritis, migraines, pneumonia, recovered, cured, cravings, tonsils, ulcer, remedies, limping, fluids,
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vaccine-preventable illnesses (the “vaccine stream”2; [16]). Although there was
significant overlap between the health and vaccine streams (due to the inclusion of the
word ”vaccine” in both) the COVID-19 dataset was largely distinct from these (among
tweets containing URLs, COVID-19 tweets only overlapped 2.4% and 0.5% with the
health and vaccine stream tweets, respectively). Additionally, we compared each of
these datasets to equivalent data from the same dates in 2019 (data prior to March 7,
2019, was not available due to a server outage). We calculated the total number of
tweets in each dataset. We restricted our analysis to English tweets only.
2.2 Measuring Source Credibility
For each data set, we identified all Twitter posts containing a URL, and extracted
these URLs. Specifically, we first unshortened any shortened links (e.g.
”bit.ly/x11234b”) using the Python ”requests” module [11] and then used the
”tldextract” Python module [20] to identify the top-level domain for each unshortened
link. We removed links to twitter.com, t.co (links that could not be unshortened), and
t.me (inadvertently removed when removing t.co). Next, we enumerated the frequency
of each top-level domain in each dataset.
We obtained a credibility rating for each domain from the MediaBiasFactCheck
(MBFC) web site [8], using an automated web scraper. MBFC rates several domains
according to their factual accuracy into six categories: “Very Low”, “Low”, “Mixed”,
“Mostly Factual”, “High”, and “Very High”. Additionally, some domains were
categorized as “Questionable” (indicating propaganda or fake news), or “Satire”. We
retained these categories.
Next, we coded as ”government” all domains ending in .gov, .gc.ca, .mil, .nhs.uk,
starting with gov., mygov., government., containing .govt. or .gov., or matching
who.int, paho.org, un.org, canada.ca, ontario.ca, toronto.ca, or alberta.ca. We also
coded as ”academic” all domains ending in .edu, containing .edu., .ac., thelancet.com,
sciencedirect.com., medrxiv.org, pnas.org, apa.org, nature.com, sciencemag.org,
nejm.org, bmj.com, mayoclinic.org, aaas.org, healthdata.org, researchgate.net, or
rand.org. Finally, we coded as ”social media” the following domains: youtube.com,
instagram.com, facebook.com, blogspot.com, reddit.com, pscp.tv, vimeo.com,
linkedin.com, and tumblr.com. Any remaining domains for which we retrieved an
MBFC rating were categorized as “news”.
We next grouped these categories into high-level indicators of credibility, with
academic, government, “very high”, and “high” MBFC scores labeled as “more
credible”; “mostly factual” and “mixed” MBFC scores labeled as “less credible”,
“low”, “very low”; and “questionable” MBFC scores labeled as “not credible”. The
remaining categories did not have MBFC scores and were therefore not given
credibility ratings. Thus and the remaining categories were labeled as “unrated”. We
next used the Webshrinker Category API [5] to assign the most popular of these
unrated domains into discrete categories and, where available, subcategories. Due to
aspirin, battling, swelling, snot, unbearable, drowsy, acl, coughs, exhaustion, steroids, tissues, unwell,
diarrhea, hives, hacking, congested, mri, chemo, achy, drugged, scratchy, dieting, sicker, sprain, h1n1,
spasms, excedrin, infections, codeine, pollen, backache, nasal, bronchitis, seasonal, ick, viral, sunscreen,
vaccine, gastric, coughed, vicodin, inhaler, excruciating, groggy, motrin, bypass, clogged, morphine,
dizziness, acupuncture, dehydration, glands, earache, migrane, vertigo, ulcers, lasik, thyroid, feverish,
achey, hayfever, respiratory, tonsillitis, sniffling, aleve, fevers, wheezing, ugh
2Containing the following keywords: vaccine, vaccines, mmr, tdap, flushot, hpv, polio, rotavirus,
chickenpox, smallpox, hepatitis, hepa, hepb, dtap, meningitis, shingles, vaccinate, vaccinated, vaccine,
vaccines, vacine, vacines, tetanus, diptheria, pertussis, whooping cough, dtp, dtwp, chicken pox, measles,
mumps, rubella, varicella, diphtheria, haemophilus, papillomavirus, meningococcal, pneumococcal, ra-
bies, tuberculosis, typhoid, yellow fever, immunizations, immunization, imunization, immune, imune,
cholera, globulin, encephalitis, lyme, zika, zeka, zeeka, zica, zeca, zeeca, h1n1, cika, sika, cica, sica,
h7n9, bird flu
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the highly-skewed distribution of domains that were shared, we scored the domains
containing the top 90% of all unrated domains shared in the dataset. We compared
proportions of these categories across each of our datasets. Additionally, we extracted
the top domains in each category and subcategory.
Finally, in order to determine which domains were more likely to be shared as part
of the “infodemic”, we calculated the relative likelihood with which each domain
appeared in the COVID-19 dataset compared to the other datasets collected in 2020.
3 Results
A total of 482,479 unique domains were shared 23,530,432 times across all five datasets.
Of these, 63,608 (13.2%) were assigned some kind of categorization (either an MBFC
rating, social media, government, academic, or a Webshrinker category). These 63,608
domains were nevertheless shared 22,448,453 (95.4%) times across all five datasets,
with no uncategorized domain shared more than 2,032 times, and no more than 2,005
times within a single dataset. Table 1 provides summary statistics of each dataset.
Table 1. Summary of collected Twitter datasets and extracted domains.
COVID-19 Health ’20 Health ’19 Vaccine ’20 Vaccine ’19
Total Tweets 186,497,312 227,737,630 239,288,971 65,370,505 48,531,886
English Tweets 100,526,523 199,700,628 225,054,861 38,612,978 32,868,100
English Tweets with URL 5,533,976 8,572,702 6,587,712 1,235,435 1,176,225
English Tweets per Keyword 35,508,841.00 771,044.90 836,635.17 603,327.78 513,564.06
Unique User Accounts 1,670,168 2,904,168 2,421,546 595,661 516,925
Tweets per User 3.31 2.95 2.72 2.11 2.28
The COVID-19 data shows more concentration overall, with a higher number of
tweets per user compared to other datasets. Additionally, the COVID-19 dataset
contains a higher proportion of English tweets, and tweets with URLs, than do the
other two datasets.
3.1 COVID-19 Tweets Overwhelm Vaccine Tweets, and
Approach All Other Health Tweets
Examining English tweets, our results show that just three COVID-19 related
keywords yielded 2.6 times more English tweets than the largest vaccine-related
dataset, collected using 64 keywords, and 3.8 times more tweets overall. Although we
collected roughly twice as many tweets in each health dataset as were in the
COVID-19 dataset, the former were collected using 269 keywords. The number of
tweets per keyword for the COVID-19 dataset was 42.44 times higher than the next
highest dataset – Health 2019.
3.2 Tweets About COVID-19 are Less Likely to be from
Non-Credible Sources than Tweets from other Datasets
Table 2 shows the proportions of domains in our datasets assigned to each of the
high-level categories (more credible, less credible, not credible, and unrated).
COVID-19 tweets contain the lowest proportion of “not credible” tweets and similar
(or higher) proportions of “more credible” tweets compared to the other datasets.
Only the Vaccine 2020 dataset has slightly more trustworthy content, but also roughly
4.7 times as much untrustworthy content. Notably, all datasets contain a majority of
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unrated tweets, with the proportions of social media data roughly consistent across
datasets.
Table 2. Proportion of URLs by category and subcategory.
Category Subcategory COVID-19 Health ’20 Health ’19 Vaccine ’20 Vaccine ’19
More Credible Academic 1.57 1.20 0.89 1.99 1.35
Government 4.19 1.83 0.96 3.24 2.53
Very High 1.51 1.56 1.29 2.66 2.09
High 17.10 14.89 12.04 18.14 17.79
TOTAL 24.37 19.49 15.18 26.04 23.76
Less Credible Mostly Factual 2.51 2.70 1.87 3.34 2.20
Mixed 7.88 11.30 7.47 12.51 11.32
TOTAL 10.38 14.00 9.33 15.85 13.52
Not Credible Low 0.98 2.28 1.57 5.61 3.30
Very Low 0.41 0.51 0.76 1.01 1.95
Questionable 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
TOTAL 1.40 2.80 2.33 6.63 5.27
Unrated Social Media 14.70 11.75 16.21 14.36 17.96
Arts/Entertainment 1.27 2.1 1.75 0.19 0.33
Automotive 0.05 0.33 0.11 0.01 0.01
Business 4.56 1.84 1.87 0.18 0.16
Careers 0.17 0.61 0.79 0.03 0.02
Education 0.5 0.51 0.35 0.11 0.06
Family/Parenting 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.02 0.02
Food/Drink 0.16 0.21 0.32 0.03 0.05
Health/Fitness 2.95 4.47 4.62 0.61 0.60
Hobbies/Interests 1.00 2.38 3.42 0.15 0.25
Home/Garden 0.06 0.08 0.13 0.01 0.03
Illegal Content 0.04 0.12 0.18 0.01 0.01
Law/Gov./Politics 0.44 0.48 0.19 0.14 0.04
News/Weather/Info. 9.83 12.5 7.88 1.84 1.95
Non-Standard Content 1.16 4.75 4.67 0.45 0.54
Personal Finance 0.96 1.16 1.18 0.1 0.05
Pets 0.12 0.15 0.29 0.06 0.07
Real Estate 0.08 4.72 0.13 0.01 0.00
Religion/Spirituality 0.58 0.31 0.45 0.04 0.03
Science 0.17 6.4 5.95 0.06 0.04
Shopping 0.76 3.72 3.39 0.21 0.32
Society 0.75 1.31 3.53 0.08 0.15
Sports 0.42 0.75 0.82 0.09 0.19
Style/Fashion 0.11 0.50 0.65 0.02 0.03
Tech./Computing 4.26 5.42 4.73 0.65 0.82
Travel 0.55 0.40 0.28 0.04 0.03
Uncategorized 0.49 0.57 0.56 0.05 0.08
Unknown 13.06 20.58 14.86 2.92 2.35
TOTAL 63.85 63.71 73.15 51.48 57.44
Like Singh et al. [26], we find that YouTube and Instagram are among the most
popular domains shared (see Table 3); however, both of these domains are shared less
often in the COVID-19 dataset than in the comparator datasets. Similarly, the
“shopping” category (containing amazon.com, and other online marketplaces) is less
popular in the COVID-19 datasets than in other datasets. In contrast, Periscope TV –
a livestreaming video service – and the “business” category are both more frequent in
the COVID-19 dataset than in other datasets, in large part due to several links to
paper.li (2.41%) – a content curation service that lets users create, and disseminate,
online newspapers (often for marketing purposes) – and fiverr.com (0.42%) – an online
freelancer marketplace.
Table 3. Summary of collected Twitter datasets and extracted domains.
Domain COVID-19 Health ’20 Health ’19 Vaccine ’20 Vaccine ’19
youtube.com 7.04 6.61 6.22 10.01 11.21
pscp.tv 3.06 0.50 0.32 0.61 0.14
instagram.com 2.49 3.18 5.40 2.54 4.18
facebook.com 0.96 0.54 2.96 0.45 1.54
blogspot.com 0.65 0.55 0.66 0.49 0.51
linkedin.com 0.48 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.08
vimeo.com 0.12 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.07
reddit.com 0.11 0.21 0.38 0.16 0.52
tumblr.com 0.04 0.17 0.22 0.12 0.13
3.3 Non-Credible and Less Credible Tweets about COVID-19
are more likely to contain state-sponsored propaganda
Table 4 shows the top 10 domains, in each high-level category, for which the
proportion of COVID-19 content exceeded that of both of the other datasets in 2020.
Results show that the first 3 domains categorized as “not credible” in the COVID-19
dataset – rt.com, presstv.com, and sputniknews.com – reflect state-sponsored media.
Additionally, Chinese state-sponsored media generated roughly equivalent amounts of
content as Russian state media, although these sources were ranked as more credible
by MBFC.
4 Discussion
Our results contextualize the widespread claims of an “infodemic” surrounding
COVID-19 on Twitter.
4.1 COVID-19 Content Vastly Exceeds Information Pertaining
to Other Viral Illnesses
We are the first to compare volumes of tweet content pertaining to COVID-19 to other
other health topics – namely, vaccines and a general health dataset. Like previous
studies, we find that there is indeed an overwhelming amount of content pertaining to
COVID-19 online. However, Twitter generates roughly 550-600 million tweets per day.
Of these, three hashtags pertaining to COVID-19 generated roughly 3.1 million tweets
per day alone, or about 0.5% of all tweets on the platform. Notably, Twitter’s rate
limit on the statuses/filter endpoint prohibits collecting more than 1% of all daily
tweets. To our knowledge, our collection of COVID-19 tweets was not rate limited, as
indicated by the absence of error messages returned from Twitter’s streaming API.
Therefore, we assume that the data set represented the complete set of matching
tweets for this time period. Similarly, the vaccine streams, which were 0.26 and 0.35
times the size of the COVID-19 twitter dataset, respectively, were not significantly
rate limited. In contrast, the health streams, which returned 22-28% more tweets,
were occasionally rate limited. Thus, we cannot accurately estimate the relative sizes
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Table 4. Top 10 domains in the COVID-19 dataset with higher relative frequencies than both the Health ’20
and Vaccine ’20 datasets, broken down by high-level category. * = state-sponsored. Content labels were derived
from wikipedia.com.
Domain COVID-19 Frequency % Relative Frequency Content
Health ’20 Vaccine ’20
Not Credible
rt.com 12,365 0.22 2.09 2.88 Russian*
presstv.com 9,268 0.16 188.73 15.60 Iranian*
sputniknews.com 3,072 0.05 1.03 1.37 Russian*
judicialwatch.org 2,121 0.04 8.19 4.11 US Conservative
frontpagemag.com 559 0.01 3.05 1.08 US Conservative
alphanewsmn.com 435 0.01 13.92 6.00 Conspiracy
cnsnews.com 415 0.01 2.02 1.16 US Conservative
madworldnews.com 412 0.01 7.69 7.13 US Conservative
shoebat.com 274 0.00 10.23 15.24 Blog
prageru.com 253 0.00 56.67 2.26 US Conservative
Less Credible
dtv.com 38,606 0.69 12.15 5.65 Indian
thehill.com 20,940 0.37 1.18 1.30 US politics
forbes.com 20,421 0.36 1.51 1.93 US business
indiatimes.com 16,198 0.29 1.23 1.21 Indian
cgtn.com 12,059 0.21 6.34 9.40 Chinese*
aljazeera.com 11,316 0.20 1.56 1.64 Qatari
xinhuanet.com 6,573 0.12 4.78 8.62 Chinese*
dailystar.co.uk 5,817 0.10 1.86 1.67 British tabloid
india.com 5,549 0.10 7.87 4.09 Indian
thequint.com 5,063 0.09 5.82 2.87 Indian
More Credible
abs-cbn.com 71,648 1.27 11.21 6.36 Filipino
medium.com 58,852 1.05 2.69 3.24 Online Publishing
weforum.org 47,055 0.84 4.59 10.72 NGO
who.int 38,746 0.69 1.77 6.50 United Nations
sky.com 24,848 0.44 1.39 1.24 British
change.org 24,691 0.44 10.38 2.03 US for profit
worldometers.info 17,478 0.31 7.12 2.53 Reference
www.gov.uk 14,840 0.26 3.03 3.54 British Government
cbc.ca 13,533 0.24 1.50 1.09 Canadian*
hindustantimes.com 13,470 0.24 3.16 2.33 Indian
Unrated
pscp.tv 169,542 3.02 5.03 6.10 Social media
paper.li 135,392 2.41 23.77 17.02 News aggregator
facebook.com 53,112 0.94 2.12 1.77 Social media
blogspot.com 35,752 0.64 1.31 1.19 Social media
thecable.ng 32,105 0.57 8.63 10.21 Nigerian
linkedin.com 26,390 0.47 3.32 2.76 Social media
fiverr.com 23,585 0.42 2.20 1.99 Online marketplace
joinzoe.com 22,341 0.40 384.95 3.09 Health Science
arcgis.com 19,817 0.35 29.40 8.02 Software
abc7.com 15,195 0.27 6.06 3.92 US Local News
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of COVID-19 dataset relative to the health streams other than to say that it was
somewhat smaller. Nevertheless, it is significant that the amount of content pertaining
to one specific disease, COVID-19, vastly exceeded that pertaining to all other viral
illnesses in the vaccine stream.
4.2 COVID-19 Tweets Contain Proportionally Less
Non-Credible Content than Other Datasets
Like prior work [15, 24, 26, 28], we find that the proportion of tweets from sources
tagged as “not credible” is quite small, with the COVID-19 dataset containing the
smallest proportion of these sources compared to other datasets. In contrast, the
amount of content from “more credible” sources was roughly one fourth of all content
across all datasets, suggesting that credible sources may be more prolific or more
frequently shared than less credible sources. In effect, the COVID-19 infodemic on
COVID-19 is more a function of information volume than information quality.
Although there are widespread concerns pertaining to the spread of misinformation
online, this issue is complicated in the context of an emerging pandemic in which there
is little known and enormous uncertainty. As the scientific understanding of this
emerging disease evolves, changing information will invariably mean that information
reported early may, in fact, be incorrect. Tweets that share data that later proves
incorrect after further study are distinctly different from deliberate attempts to share
misinformation or disinformation for other ulterior motives.
4.3 The COVID-19 Infodemic is a Vector for State-Sponsored
Propaganda
State-sponsored propaganda, and especially Russian and Iranian state media that
MBFC ranks as ”Low” or ”Very Low” factual accuracy, were more likely to tweet
about COVID-19 than about other health concerns. Additionally, Chinese state media
that MBFC rated as “Mixed” factual accuracy displayed significantly more interest in
COVID-19 than in other health topics. These findings are consistent with recent
testimony from the US State Department indicating that Russia, China, and Iran may
be active in spreading disinformation about COVID-19 online [1]. Nevertheless, our
findings indicate that these specific state-sponsored sources are only 0.77% of our
dataset and are far exceeded in volume by content from more credible sources. Indeed,
several privately-owned mainstream news sources representing British, Filipino, Indian,
Nigerian, and Qatari perspectives also showed increased interest in COVID-19 across a
range of different credibility ratings; however, more credible US news sources actually
published proportionally less content about COVID-19 than about other health topics.
4.4 The Credibility of Most Online Content Cannot Be
Determined
The majority of content from each of our datasets came from websites that could not
be rated. In particular, almost half of all content was grouped into five unrated
categories: social media, “News / Weather / Information”, “Business”, “Technology &
Computing”, and “Unknown”. The top domains within each of these categories reflect
significant information dissemination. For example, the “News / Weather /
Information” category contains sources that simply have not been rated by MBFC
(e.g., thecable.ng, citinewsroom.com, etc.), perhaps because they reflect audiences
with which MBFC’s fact checkers are not familiar (e.g., African audiences). The
“Unknown” category also contains several unrated news sources (e.g., abc7.com,
9/13
newsfilter.io, etc.), but also self-published subscription content, such as onlyfans.com.
News and other information-seeking behavior also falls into the remaining categories,
with “Business” containing links to paper.li, and “Technology & Computing”
containing links to apple.news and google.com, all of which can be used as content
curation services. Finally, social media platforms can be used to redirect users to news,
but also to self-published content of indeterminate credibility. Social media is a major
source of online content about COVID-19, but no more nor less than for other sites.
Like paper.li, these sites serve the role of content-curation, enabling people to
circumvent the fact-checking role of elite journalistic institutions. Notably, some of the
largest sources of misinformation were primarily spread using these types of media
(e.g., “Plandemic” was spread on Facebook, YouTube, Vimeo, and Twitter [18]).
4.5 Limitations and Directions for Future Work
Our study has several limitations that may be addressed by future research. Primarily,
credible sources do not necessarily indicate credible content, and vice versa. Especially
during a pandemic where what is known to be truthful is highly uncertain,
misinformation may spread through credible channels. Additionally, links to low
credibility sources may sometimes be shared insincerely or sarcastically – retweets do
not always indicate endorsement. Furthermore, information may spread on Twitter
without containing an external URL. Nevertheless, measures of the prevalence of these
sites are an adequate metric of the scope of the infodemic to the extent that it refers
to the volume of information available. Additionally, we cannot, and do not, claim,
that data from Twitter are representative of the general public, or even of all social
media. Indeed, news sources may be more likely to be shared by automated accounts
(“bots”) than other types of tweets, especially when those bots serve as news
aggregators. For example, Yang and colleagues recently showed that there is a
higher-than-normal prevalence of bot postings in the coronavirus tweets [28], with
even a highly-rated news site like nytimes.com tweeted by social bots nearly 5% of the
time [28]. As above, measures of URL prevalence are an indicator of information
availability rather than information consumption. Lastly, we recognize that relying on
MBFC for categorizing news sites as trustworthy or untrustworthy may be a limiting
factor. Future work should consider incorporating new and different sources of expert
categorization such as the multimodal repository created by Zhou et al. [29] and
Newsguardtech.com [9]. Finally, we restricted our analysis to a single platform –
Twitter. Future research should apply a similar methodology to other platforms.
4.6 Conclusions
In conclusion, our results reflect a complex information environment that can’t be
characterized by simple “false” vs. “true” dichotomy of online content. Although prior
work has shown that the proportion of information from low credibility sources is
quite small, our results demonstrate that these proportions are even smaller for
COVID-19 tweets. Thus, attempts to combat misinformation that focus on low
credibility sources, such as sites that peddle conspiracy theories or false cures, may be
missing the larger body of misinformation that is factually mixed, or even true, yet
out of context, or that has changed significantly over time. Under conditions of deep
uncertainty, source credibility may be a false signal of misinformative content. Beyond
these considerations, we find that most content is unrated and perhaps even can’t be
rated, concomitant with the deep uncertainty underlying an emerging infectious
disease during a pandemic. Even if we were able to rate all sources according to
meaningful credibility metrics, news aggregation sites, such as paper.li, or social media
platforms that disseminate user-generated content, do not employ fact-checkers at the
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scale required to provide credibility assessments for all of their content. Furthermore,
there is no legitimate expectation that user-generated content is subject to the same
fact-checking standards as journalistic, government, or academic sources. Nevertheless,
this content is overwhelming in scope and varied in style, making it difficult for users
to distinguish between fact, opinion, misinformation, and satire. This further
underscores the importance of distinguishing between disinformation – content that is
generated for malicious purposes by non-credible actors – and misinformation that
may come about due to the search for meaning in a legitimately uncertain
environment. It is precisely when society faces these “meaning threats” that
misinformation becomes plausible, possibly moving from the fringes (e.g.,
state-sponsored propaganda and conspiracist sites) into the mainstream [25]. Under
these circumstances, efforts to fact-check or otherwise promote “mythbusters” may be
missing the larger point that there is a need to communicate the fundamental gist of
uncertainty as information about the virus changes from day-to-day, while managing
expectations that information will change as we learn more.
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